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Michael L. Oates*
Introduction
It is a pleasure to be back in Newport and an honor to speak to you this af-ternoon. I have a lot of great memories from my days as a student here at the Naval
War College; it was undoubtedly one of the most enjoyable experiences of my ca-
reer, both from a personal and a professional standpoint.
When I visit places like this, I am often reminded that as military officers, we
don’t get enough opportunities during our careers to pause and think critically
about our profession. To that end, I think it is important for military officers to
spend time in academic environments such as this where they can read, write, lis-
ten to speakers, attend conferences like this one and interact with people who have
different experiences, different points of view.
To you military officers in the audience today who are students here at the Naval
War College, I say enjoy your time here, but make good use of it. Take some of
those ideas that have been bouncing around in your head and share them with the
rest of us. We have an old saying in the Army that a soldier should always improve
his foxhole. I believe, as leaders, we have a similar obligation to our profession.
That means having the courage to speak up and share ideas about how you think
we can do things better. Granted, that is not always easy. People with innovative
ideas often receive their fair share of pushback. But the flip side is you never know
when one of your ideas will be the catalyst for real, meaningful change. As
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President John Quincy Adams said, “If your actions inspire others to dream more,
learn more, do more, and become more, you are a leader.”
Now that I have talked about the benefits of being in an academic setting, I have
to poke a little fun at the folks who do this for a living. After spending the last thir-
teen months with my soldiers in Iraq—guys who use short sentences filled with
colorful expletives, and for whom the word “hooah” is a noun, a verb and an all-
purpose adjective—I had to chuckle when I saw the topic that the good people at
the Naval War College asked me to address today in ninety minutes or less: “Pro-
vide a commander’s perspective on the Iraq war. Discuss the principal military ob-
jectives and problems encountered in the offensive campaign, counterinsurgency
operations, and the occupation and stability phases of the Iraq war.”
Since I knew the audience would primarily be attorneys and academics, I asked
my staff judge advocate, Mike Ryan, to explain the topic to me. Unfortunately, he
spent thirteen months with me in Iraq, and I think it affected his ability to deal with
complex subjects because when I asked for his help, he read the topic, shook his
head and said: “Sir, I don’t know what it means, but it sounds pretty hooah.”
In all seriousness, let me start by saying that contrary to what you might think, I
have no special insight about the war in Iraq. One thing I’ve learned over the years
is that in Iraq, as in every war, a person’s knowledge of things really depends on
three things: when they were there, where they operated and their job. A soldier
who fought in the Ia Drang Valley of Vietnam in 1965, for example, would have a
much different perspective on the Vietnam War than, say, a Marine who fought in
Northern I-Corps or a Navy pilot who flew bombing missions from an aircraft car-
rier. In much the same way, my experiences as an Assistant Division Commander for
Operations in northern Iraq in 2006 and 2007 differed considerably from my experi-
ences as a Division Commander in central and southern Iraq in 2008 and 2009. And,
of course, neither of those two experiences resembled the time I spent as Chief of
Staff to the Chief Operations Officer, Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad.
So what I have to say about Iraq today should probably be qualified to some ex-
tent since, like any other soldier, my remarks and opinions are based primarily on
my own experiences during selected snapshots in time. Unlike a lot of folks who
come to Iraq, receive a briefing in the Green Zone, then leave the country the next
day, I will not claim to be an expert on Iraq.
The Initial Offensive Phase
As we all know, the war in Iraq began in March 2003 and it is still going on as we sit
here today. Given the length of the war, and the infinite number of issues we could
discuss, it should come as no surprise that in the next ninety minutes we will have
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to concentrate on a few key issues and try to hit just the wave tops. Also, I hope this
will be more of a dialogue than a speech, so I will make a few key points on each is-
sue and leave plenty of time for your questions and comments.
In keeping with the topics I was given, I will start by saying a few words about the
initial offensive phase of the war. I think this is a subject worthy of discussion be-
cause it provides us with a number of important lessons learned.
I think the major lesson we learned during the initial phase of the war can be
summed up by the age-old military maxim “you fight like you train.” On that
point, I would submit to you that prior to the invasion of Iraq no military in the
world trained itself and its leaders for combat better than the US military. How we
got to that level of proficiency is a remarkable story in and of itself and, as we will
discuss later, it is a story that, in my opinion, is still instructive today.
In the post-Vietnam era, the men who commanded platoons and companies in
Vietnam took a hard look at how the Vietnam War was conducted and what it did
to the military. As they began to occupy positions of power they drew on those bit-
ter experiences and said, “Never again.” Those men—the ones author James
Kitfield called the “prodigal soldiers”1—rolled up their sleeves and rebuilt the US
military, taking an institution crippled by drug use, disciplinary problems, racial
tensions, poor training and inadequate resources, and making it the best trained,
best equipped, most professional fighting force the world has ever seen.
I have some personal experience with that time, having graduated from the US
Military Academy in 1979. These days, when I hear younger officers complain
about the Army, I am quick to remind them that I joined an Army that had just lost
a war. Using words that are much too colorful for this forum, I go on to tell them
that they simply cannot conceive how messed up that Army was then.
But in 2003, that was certainly not the case. As I noted a moment ago, what our
military did best in the years leading up to the invasion of Iraq was train for com-
bat. Our ground forces—the Army in particular—did this at our combat training
centers: the National Training Center for our heavy forces and the Joint Readiness
Training Center for our light fighters.
Because we were so well trained, so well equipped, so well led and so well
resourced, we were able to invade Iraq in March 2003, defeat its military and topple
its government in relatively short order using a force with less combat power than
the one that liberated Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm. Putting aside the
political reasons we invaded Iraq in 2003 and looking at things from a purely mili-
tary standpoint, I think no fair-minded person can deny that our military was tre-
mendously successful during the opening phase of the war. I believe that success
was because we fought like we trained. What we did not know then—and if we are
honest with ourselves, what we must admit now—is that as good as our combat
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training was, we were not well trained, well resourced or well prepared for the post-
combat phase. To paraphrase the now famous quote from Secretary of State Colin
Powell: we did a great job breaking Iraq, but we were not prepared for what hap-
pened once we bought it.
I say that understanding full well that hindsight is 20/20 and it is easy for me to
stand here and critique operations after the fact. That is certainly not my intent.
But part of making our military better is, as I mentioned at the outset, having the
courage to look hard at ourselves in order to identify where we could have done
things better and where we should change things in the future.
I sometimes tell my subordinates, “You’re entitled to your own opinions, but
you’re not entitled to your own facts.” In that vein, if we are fair and realistic, we
have to say the facts with regard to the post-conflict phase speak for themselves,
and what they tell is that the US military was neither trained nor resourced to be an
occupying force in a country as large and complex as Iraq.
Even today, after all of the tremendous work the military has done in Iraq along
the governance, economics, civil capacity and rule of law lines of effort, there are
still those who argue that using the military for missions other than combat opera-
tions is like trying to hammer nails with a screwdriver. I have my own ideas on that
point, some of which I will share with you later in this presentation.
Counterinsurgency Operations
Turning to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, it is important to look at the
situation that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place. As I noted previously,
our initial invasion of Iraq was quick and successful militarily. However when the
dust settled we looked around and realized that we were in charge of a country
twice the size of Idaho; a country with six international borders and a population of
over twenty-two million people from different religious, ethnic, cultural and tribal
backgrounds. People who, as we soon found out, in many cases didn’t like each
other very much.
As if this situation were not challenging enough, the country we were in charge
of had a long history of violence and oppression committed by a corrupt, dictato-
rial central government—a government that had systematically abused, neglected,
stolen from and murdered its own citizens. It was a place where, in the best of cases,
disputes were settled with decisions made by sheiks and tribal elders; in the worst of
cases, they were settled with kidnapping, violence and murder. To make the prob-
lem even more interesting, the country we now controlled had no functioning po-
lice force or court system, and very little in the way of essential services like water,
sewer, sanitation, medical care and electricity.
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As someone with a background in physics, I can tell you that nature really does
abhor a vacuum, and post-invasion Iraq was no exception. Accordingly, in little to
no time, the power vacuums that existed in Iraq after the fall of the former regime
were filled by a number of very dedicated and very aggressive groups, all vying for
power and control.
Like most things in Iraq, the insurgency was split along religious, cultural and
ethnic lines. Insurgents ranged from the Shiite groups like Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) to
the Sunni-led Al Qaeda in Iraq, and everything in between. In addition to their de-
sire for power and control, most of these groups shared an intense hatred of the co-
alition forces, which they saw as occupiers. In the case of some of these groups,
most notably Al Qaeda in Iraq, they were willing to commit horrific acts of violence
and terrorism not only against military forces, but against anyone not aligned with
their agenda, including Iraqi civilians.
So there we were, a relatively small military force being asked to confront a lit-
any of problems—ones that would eventually take years to solve. We had to deal
with everything from defeating a violent insurgency to meeting the basic human
needs of the Iraqi civilian population and myriad problems falling between those
two extremes. The challenges inherent in defeating the insurgency are something
that could be talked about and debated for hours. In keeping with my “wave tops”
approach to this talk, I will simply say that it took us a while to figure out the right
approach.
How to defeat the insurgency in Iraq was something of a “chicken and egg” di-
lemma: do we concentrate on solving the problems of the Iraqi people—most no-
tably things like essential services—first, or do we focus on killing and capturing
the bad guys and, once things are secure, concentrate on making the Iraqis’ daily
lives better? Some, including many of our senior military leaders in Iraq during the
first part of the war, advocated the former.
This “essential services first” school of thought argued that if the Iraqi people
had electricity, clean water, trash pickup and schools for their children, they would
be less likely to turn to a violent insurgency to solve their problems. It was a reason-
able approach, one that makes sense on its face. We traveled along that line of drift
for the first few years of the war, but what we eventually found was our successes
were not really widespread or sustainable.
Again, I am not saying there is no merit at all to this approach. I will be the first
one to tell you that you cannot kill your way out of a situation such as we had in
Iraq. Attriting the enemy is undoubtedly important, but what we learned over time
in Iraq was that success in a counterinsurgency campaign depends on more than
just killing the enemy. There is a time and a place to do that for sure, but in coun-
terinsurgency you have to take things a step further. To put it simply, you have to
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kill the right guys at the right places at the right times. Lethal operations have to dis-
rupt networks and take out financiers. It’s graduate-level stuff that goes well be-
yond the basic infantryman’s ability to enter and clear a room.
I think another problem we had with defeating the insurgency relates in a way to
the point I made in my initial remarks about fighting like we trained. What do I
mean by that? Let me explain. The US military has always been at its best when it
goes toe-to-toe with a definable, quantifiable enemy. In fact, many of our senior
leaders during the first part of the Iraq war were guys who trained virtually all of
their professional lives to defeat Soviet and Warsaw Pact armored formations
coming through the Fulda Gap. In that kind of fighting, metrics and data are criti-
cally important: How many tanks am I up against? How many gallons of fuel do I
have? How many BMPs,2 tanks and artillery pieces do I have to kill before the enemy
is combat ineffective? In my opinion, early in the war we often fell back on that mode
of thinking, relying on numbers and metrics as a measure of our effectiveness.
Indeed, if you look back on the first few years of the war, our reports and brief-
ings from that time were filled with statistics: number of patrols conducted, num-
ber of caches found and cleared, number of improvised explosive device (IED) or
indirect fire attacks. With respect to the “essential services first” approach dis-
cussed a few moments ago, this love of numbers fit right into the template for suc-
cess. We tracked the number of schools built, number of hours of electricity
provided, number of Commander’s Emergency Response Program projects initi-
ated and number of dollars spent on those projects. With so many impressive sta-
tistics, pie charts and metrics on so many colorful PowerPoint slides, how could we
be losing?
The problem was we were losing. To some extent, I attribute that to something
that absolutely drives me around the bend: we were constantly looking at data
without doing any analysis of what that data really means. To make matters worse,
the data were often interpreted by people farthest from the source of the data—good
people who through no fault of their own had no context whatsoever. When I think
of those days, I am reminded of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who said of
Vietnam: “Every quantitative measurement we have shows we’re winning this war.”3
In my judgment, too often we relied on the raw numbers instead of thinking
about what those numbers really meant. What I think we learned over time is that
counterinsurgency is about people, not about data. It’s not easy, as I indicated ear-
lier when I addressed killing the enemy during COIN operations; it’s graduate-
level stuff. You have to do the hard work and take things a step further. You have to
analyze people, relationships, networks and all kinds of complicated dynamics that
take place between people on the ground and, in the case of Iraq, you have to un-
derstand the culture.
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I think as a military force we became much more successful against the insur-
gency in Iraq when, under the leadership of General Petraeus and others who had
taken a hard look at counterinsurgency, we realized that this fight was about peo-
ple. People and relationships really are the center of gravity in a COIN fight. To get
to know people, we had to get out of our forward operating bases, out of our vehi-
cles and out of our comfort zones, and start talking to the Iraqis, developing rela-
tionships and partnering with the police and the army units we were over there
trying to help.
Once we started talking to people, one of the first things we learned was that our
“essential services first” approach was probably not the way to go. Under General
Petraeus and General Odierno, we transitioned to the alternate view and began to
secure the population. I think in many ways this helped us to tip the balance in our
favor. Of course our success was enabled by a number of other factors, including
the Anbar Awakening4 and the Sons of Iraq,5 the JAM ceasefire and, of course, the
US troop surge. But none of those things, in my opinion, would have in and of itself
brought us success without the change in direction and strategy, changes that
forced us to stop looking at numbers and start talking to people.
Stability Operations
I would like to close my formal remarks by addressing our experience with stability
operations in Iraq. In terms of recent experience, this is a subject I am very familiar
with since the Army division I commanded in Iraq for the last year had governance,
economics, civil capacity building and rule of law as its major lines of effort, espe-
cially during the second half of our tour.
When our division arrived in Iraq in May 2008, a number of us on the division
staff had served in Iraq before. One of the first things that struck us all was the im-
provement in the security situation, especially in our area of operations, which en-
compassed most of central and southern Iraq. It was something that took us all a
while to get used to.
In fact, during our first month in country, we were directed by our corps head-
quarters to assist the Iraqi army with retaking the city of Amarah, a large city in
southeastern Iraq that had traditionally been a hotbed of Jaish al-Mahdi activity.
Our staff worked hard on the plan. We spent considerable time looking in great de-
tail at things like supporting fires, close air support, medical evacuation and de-
tainee handling and processing. I even took my staff judge advocate with me to a
joint planning meeting with the Iraqis at a place called Camp Sparrow Hawk near
the city of Amarah because we were sure we would have to discuss rules of engage-
ment, targeting and detainee issues with the Iraqi Army leadership.
161
Michael L. Oates
Vol 86.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 86\_Ventura\Vol 86.vp
Monday, May 24, 2010 11:46:42 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
To make a long story short, a few days later, Iraqi security forces (ISF) entered
Amarah and retook the city without firing a single shot. For many of us who had
been to Iraq before, the Amarah operation was something of a wake-up call. It
demonstrated to us that things in Iraq really had changed. Now this is not to say
Iraq is a safe place to be. It is still dangerous. During Task Force Mountain’s tenure
in Iraq we had fourteen soldiers killed and another sixty wounded. My point is that
by the time we arrived, Iraqi security forces were well on their way to becoming a
very proficient, capable force, and that, in my opinion, was one of the reasons we
were able to focus our efforts on more non-kinetic missions.
In terms of stability operations, let me say just a few words about our work with
Iraqi security forces. During our tour we partnered extensively with the Iraqi army,
the Iraqi police, and the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement. In fact, be-
cause I believed so strongly that a capable ISF is one of the major keys to stability
in Iraq, I made ISF professionalization my division’s main effort during the first
half of the deployment.
Similar to what I addressed during the discussion on counterinsurgency, one of
the things we found was that the better we got to know our ISF counterparts on a
human level, the better we were able to teach, coach and mentor them, and the
better they became. Our approach was simple—we made the ISF part of our for-
mations. By that, I mean we did things like “shadow tracking” their supply, main-
tenance and personnel statistics so we could help them where they needed help the
most. Not to put too fine a point on it, but I told my commanders and many of my
staff from the start that I would judge their success by the success of their ISF
partners.
I think the development of the ISF was the key to stability and I am proud to say
our ISF partners developed into a tremendously capable force. By the middle part
of our tour, for example, we stopped conducting unilateral operations in our divi-
sion and began performing everything by, with and through the ISF. What we
found was that as the ISF worked with us and became more professional, so did we.
For their part, the ISF know the people, speak the language and can pick up on a lot
of things we can’t as Americans. For our part, we bring a wealth of knowledge on
how to man, train and equip an army, along with a number of technologically ad-
vanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms and other enablers
to which the ISF don’t have access. By letting the ISF take the lead, we found the
Iraqi people began to see them as a force that could be trusted—and trust is a criti-
cal component of Iraqi culture. As a measure of that trust, I will tell you that by the
end of our tour over 90 percent of the tips we received about things like weapons
caches and IEDs came from local nationals, usually through the ISF. I see that as a
sign of real progress in the stability realm.
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As I mentioned a moment ago, governance, economics, civil capacity building
and rule of law were major lines of effort for us during Task Force Mountain’s tour
in Iraq—so much so that during our train up, we reorganized our fires and effects
cell and devoted it almost entirely to governance, economics and reconstruction. I
added a full-time political adviser from the Department of State to my staff and di-
rected my Deputy Commanding General for Support to take the lead for all mat-
ters having to do with governance and civil capacity building. Given the time,
resources and energy we put into those missions, I could talk about any one of
them for hours, but since many of you in the audience are legal professionals, I will
touch on some of our initiatives in the rule of law line of effort that I believe you
will find interesting.
I think two things combined to jump-start our rule of law efforts during the last
year. The first was the improved security situation that allowed us to focus on tasks
and missions outside the security line of operation. The second was the implemen-
tation of the US-Iraq security agreement.6
For those of you unfamiliar with the security agreement, in January 2009 it re-
placed United Nations Security Council Resolution 17907 as the legal authority for
US operations in Iraq. To my knowledge, the US-Iraq security agreement is the
only status-of-forces-type agreement to which the United States is a party that au-
thorizes US forces to conduct combat operations in the host nation. The caveat to
that authorization is that our operations must be approved by and coordinated
with the government of Iraq, and they must be conducted with full respect for Iraqi
law and the Iraqi Constitution.
The requirement for us to conduct operations in accordance with Iraqi law has
had a profound effect on the way we do things. In fact, many of you might be sur-
prised to learn that the vast majority of US military operations in Iraq these days
are conducted pursuant to arrest and search warrants issued by Iraqi judges.
By way of background, the Iraqi legal system is very similar to the US legal sys-
tem with respect to criminal procedure. Before an arrest warrant can be issued, evi-
dence must be presented to an Iraqi investigative judge. If the judge issues a
warrant and the individual is apprehended, Iraqi law mandates that the person be
brought before a judge within twenty-four hours for a detention hearing.
Because the security agreement requires US forces to abide by Iraqi law, we are
bound by the rules I just described. In much the same way as I described how our
efforts to professionalize the ISF were successful when we made them part of our
formations, the security agreement’s requirement that we work through the Iraqi
legal system helped us make great strides in the rule of law. As we started moving
actions through the Iraqi courts and dealing with Iraqi judges, we found that there
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was a certain amount of dysfunction in the Iraqi legal system, especially at the pro-
vincial level.
The police were often poorly trained, the judges were overworked and under-
resourced, and the detention facilities had their share of issues. Based on the fact
that we had to obtain warrants, our units had to develop better relationships with
the police, the prosecutors and the judges in their local areas. In doing so, we were
able to better identify gaps, seams and shortcomings in their training and in their
systems that we were able to address.
One thing we found initially was that the Iraqi police and judges were not famil-
iar with forensic evidence. Their legal system has always been testimony based. To
help solve this problem we developed a number of innovative programs to train
Iraqi judges and Iraqi prosecutors on forensic evidence. In a companion effort, US
police training teams worked to train Iraqi police on basic crime scene investiga-
tion techniques and the fundamentals of actually securing forensic evidence. Fi-
nally, US explosive ordnance disposal experts have made great strides in teaching
the Iraqi army how to collect basic forensic evidence at the sites of IED blasts and at
the points of origin and points of impact of rocket and mortar attacks.
Since the implementation of the security agreement, US commanders have be-
come well versed in obtaining arrest warrants and detention orders from investiga-
tive judges. To accomplish this task, most US divisions and brigades have formed
law enforcement task forces made up of individuals with the relevant expertise.
The organization of each task force varies slightly; however, most include judge ad-
vocates, military police officers, intelligence analysts, and one or more US contrac-
tors known as law enforcement professionals (LEPs). The LEPs are a relatively new
addition to the fight in Iraq. Most are retired police officers from cities around the
United States who are under contract to assist US forces with law enforcement–
related tasks and training. The expertise and experience the LEPs have provided
have been invaluable during the transition to warrant-based operations.
As you all know, one of the major keys to stability in any country is having a legal
system the citizens can trust and depend on. Without a system for the peaceful res-
olution of disputes, order breaks down and people take the law into their own
hands. I think our efforts in the rule of law arena have been a major driver of stabil-
ity, especially in central and southern Iraq.
Conclusion
I will conclude by saying there is still a lot of hard work ahead of us in Iraq. By all in-
dications, Iraq will turn out to be the longest war our nation has ever experienced
and the effects of the war, especially on our military, remain to be seen.
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For the military officers in the room today, I say be proud of what your profes-
sion has accomplished in Iraq. As I noted at the start, never stop thinking how to
make things better. For our friends from other branches of public service and from
the services of allied nations, I commend you. Very few citizens of any nation an-
swer their country’s call these days. Those of you who have should be immensely
proud. For those of you from academia and non-governmental organizations, I
hope you will keep thinking, keep writing and keep challenging us to do our jobs
better. Without debate and constructive criticism, we in the military can get too
comfortable with our own points of view.
It has been my pleasure to get the chance to spend time with you today. Thank
you very much.
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